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Abstract
We model the performance of a speaker recognition sys-
tem used for surveillance to prioritize a large number of
candidate speakers in search of a single target speaker. It is
assumed that the system operates by ordering all speakers
in order from best match to worst match, with the goal of
having the true speaker sample positioned as high as pos-
sible on the list. Some performance measures for prioriti-
zation systems are given and are applied to a real speaker
recognition system. An analytic expression for the proba-
bility density function of the true speaker’s position on the
list is found, subject to basic assumptions concerning the
distribution of true speaker and false speaker scores. A
comparison is made to the performance of a system which
is operating only by making verification decisions, and it
is shown that making soft decisions results in significantly
better surveillance performance.
1. Introduction
There are two main applications for speaker recognition
technology. The most frequently considered is the verifica-
tion of cooperative speakers on a per-trial basis. The other
is for surveillance of a large set of speech samples to try to
locate a given speaker of interest. The obvious application
is to law enforcement and intelligence activities but areas
such as news indexing are also relevant [1]. The analysis
presented here is applicable to other similar areas of proba-
bilistic pattern recognition.
Some researchers have concentrated on the open-set
identification task, where the question asked of the sys-
tem is, “which, if any, of the sample speakers is the target
speaker?”. While this is indeed the question in general to
be addressed by surveillance systems, the performance met-
ric universally used is the raw recognition rate. We believe
that for some applications a surveillance system that con-
sistently almost recognizes the target speaker can be just as
useful as one which is consistently correct and present here
performance measures to demonstrate this. We were unable
to locate previous work discussing this aspect of the use of
speaker recognition systems for surveillance.
2. The need for caution
It is widely recognized that caution is required when ad-
vocating the use of speaker recognition systems in foren-
sic contexts [4]. This is because: the ramifications of the
experiment outcome are potentially severe; it is easy for
non-experts to place too much reliance on an experiment
outcome without understanding the true significance of the
result; the speaker recognition experiment is merely part of
a larger decision-making process and the technology must
be set up in such a way as to not usurp parts of that process
which do not properly belong to it; and the effects of such
factors as intentional voice disguise, time lapse, illness and
uncontrolled recording conditions are poorly understood at
best.
These words of warning apply also to the use of auto-
matic recognition technologies in surveillance systems. In
addition, the probable secrecy (with respect to the subjects)
of the surveillance operation denies them the opportunity to
rebut or refute any claim of identity by the system. This ap-
plies to an even greater extent to systems used in the manner
outlined in this paper, where substantial numbers of errors
are to be expected relative to the number of successful de-
tections, thus necessitating the intervention and cooperation
of human experts. It is the responsibility of system develop-
ers to educate users and potential users of surveillance sys-
tems regarding the dangers of naive use of such systems and
to emphasize that surveillance systems should not be used
as primary evidence of identity in subsequent actions, legal
or otherwise. Nevertheless, surveillance systems are an in-
valuable tool for directing the attention of suitably trained
experts towards subjects who are more likely to be of at-
tention to them, and it is in this context that this paper is
written.
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3 Verification mode
Speaker recognition researchers and users are familiar
with the verification mode of system use. This is based
on a series of individual trials, each of which results in
a decision to accept or reject the claimed identity. Using
this mode of operation for surveillance means treating each
sample as a claim to identity of the target speaker and decid-
ing whether or not to accept the claim based on whether or
not the score produced by the system exceeds some pre-set
threshold. This threshold may be dependent on the target
speaker, and may even vary randomly from trial to trial [3],
but the important fact is that a hard accept/reject decision is
made.
3.1 Verification behaviour
Verification behaviour is well-captured by the standard
Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curve [5] which shows the
relationship between the probability of a miss p(m) and
the probability of a false alarm p(f). The DET curve is
in essence a ROC curve displayed on axes scaled by nor-
mal deviates rather than linearly. An intuitively comfortable
statistic of interest for a surveillance system is false alarms
per hit, and the associated rate of misses for a given oper-
ating point. If Nf false trials must be attempted for every
true trial, we find that the number of false alarms is Nfp(f)
while the number of successful hits is 1− p(m). This gives
the system a performance of Nfp(f)1−p(m) false alarms per hit,
while missing p(m) of the targets.
3.2 Verification example
In [9] there appears an argument that large scale surveil-
lance systems are impractical, as the number of false alarms
will inevitably swamp the number of hits, even assuming
unreasonably small error probabilities. The example given
is as follows. A surveillance system is required to search
1012 samples looking for 10 target samples. For simplicity,
we reduce this to a system searching 1011 samples looking
for 1 target sample, though the two tasks are not equivalent,
as we will discuss later. The system has a false negative
rate p(m) = 0.001 and a false positive rate of p(f) = 0.01.
The author of [9] does the arithmetic described above and
concludes, ‘This unrealistically-accurate system will gen-
erate one billion false alarms for every real terrorist plot it
uncovers.’
We argue that this reasoning is valid if the system is op-
erating in verification mode, where a hard yes/no decision
is made for each sample. However, in some surveillance ap-
plications, the performance can be improved significantly.
4 Prioritization mode
Surveillance systems need not make hard decisions, and
in view of the points of expressed in Section 2, it may be
unwise to do so. A more appropriate use may be as a tool
to prioritize samples for further examination by experts.
It is assumed that the surveillance system is operating
on a large set of samples, with the task of interest being to
locate the single speaker of interest. While this may seem
an unrealistic constraint, it models somewhat accurately a
type of surveillance application where the primary goal is to
search for a single target, regardless of the number of actual
targets present. This may be, for example, because once
a single target is located, associated collateral information
allows the easy (or easier) detection of all remaining targets.
The system presents its finding in the form of a queue
- an ordered list of samples in descending order of likeli-
hood of being the speaker of interest. We further assume
that the user of the system has no further information on
the likelihood of the speaker of interest being in any given
sample, but is able, on inspecting the samples, to make a
determination as to whether the true speaker is present or
not. Thus, the user’s rational approach is to inspect each
sample in order from the top of the queue down. The sur-
veillance system will be most useful when the target appears
as close as possible to the top of the queue. It is clear that
assessing prioritization performance by examining verifica-
tion performance is equivalent to assuming that all target
samples scores greater than the threshold are strictly less
than all false samples that also exceed the threshold, which
is clearly not the case.
However, in reality there may be multiple target samples
present, and the system as described will detect the target
who is positioned highest in the queue. This will tend to im-
prove overall performance under the constraints assumed,
so we have concentrated on analysing the average perfor-
mance as a worst-case scenario.
5 Modelling queueing performance
We assume the the recognition system is some type of
system which produces a real-valued score, indicating the
likelihood that the sample under examination is a match
to the target. Current state-of-the-art speaker recognition
technologies use Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) which
exhibit this type of behaviour. It is assumed that true
speaker scores are distributed as univariate Gaussian vari-
ables, as are false speaker scores. False speaker scores are
assumed to have been normalized to a standard normal dis-
tribution, that is with mean µf = 0 and standard deviation
σf = 1. True speaker scores are also normally distributed,
with mean µt and standard deviation σt. While it is known
that neither true speaker scores or false speaker score are
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actually normally distributed [6], most researchers assume
that they are. This not only provides a benefit in simplic-
ity, it has also been used to develop several effective score
normalisation techniques such those in [8, 2].
We assume that there is a set of Nf false speaker samples
and one true speaker sample, making the total sample size
N = Nf + 1.
We are interested in the proportion of false speakers who
are expected to score higher than the true speaker. If the
false speaker’s score was t, then the proportion of false
speakers who scored higher than t is equal to the proba-
bility that a single speaker scores higher than t. We assume
that µf = 0 and σf = 1, which gives
ρ = P (y > t) =
1√
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π
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ds. (3)
Since ρ = u(t) is a one-to-one function, there exists an
inverse function t = w(ρ), and it is easy to find that
w(ρ) =
√
2 erf−1(1− 2ρ) (4)
where y = erf−1(x) is the inverse function of y = erf(x).
If the distribution function of t is f(t), and ρ = u(t), ρ
has the distribution function
g(ρ) = f [w(ρ)] |J | , (5)
where J = dtdρ and is called the Jacobian of w. J be found
by noting that
d erf−1(z)
dz
=
1
2
√
π exp
[(
erf−1(z)
)2]
, (6)
which gives us, after differentiating using the chain rule,
J =
dt
dρ
= −
√
2π exp
[(
erf−1(1 − 2ρ))2] . (7)
Thus, since t has the distribution
f(t) =
1√
2πσt
exp
[
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2
[
t− µt
σt
]2]
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Figure 1. Mean target speaker position for
varying µt and σt.
this leads to the following expression for g(ρ),
g(ρ) =
1
σt
exp
[
−1
2
(
w(ρ) − µt
σt
)2
+
(
erf−1(1 − 2ρ))2
]
(9)
where w(ρ) is given by equation 4.
6 Performance measures
6.1 Mean target speaker position
The mean target speaker position is given by
ρ¯ =
∫ ∞
∞
ρg(ρ)dρ, (10)
where g(ρ) is given by equation 9. ρ¯ gives the expected
proportion of the false speakers who will score higher than
the target speaker. This statistic is useful for such pur-
poses as forecasting the average resource utilization per tar-
get speaker detection. Figure 1 shows a plot of mean target
speaker position for a range of different values of µt and σt.
6.2 Median target speaker position
In general, as µt increases and σt decreases, g(ρ) be-
comes increasingly skewed. This means that usually the
target speaker is very close to the top of the queue, but oc-
casionally appears far down the list. In these situations it
is unlikely that analysts would continue to examine each
sample that far down the queue, especially since in some
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applications the target speaker may not actually be present
in the set under examination. In these cases, a more useful
statistic is the median target speaker position ρ˜. This gives
the number of entries in the queue that should be examined
to successfully locate the target speaker half the time. It
can be found from the value of ρ for which the cumulative
density function h(ρ) = 0.5, where
h(ρ) =
∫ ρ
∞
g(s)ds. (11)
6.3 Truncated-queue mean target speaker
position
A truncated queue of length N is simply the top-N mem-
bers of a queue, which may or may not contain the target
speaker. Let Lq denote the length of the truncated queue
which will, with probability q, contain the target speaker.
Mathematically,
q =
∫ Lq
0
g(ρ) dρ. (12)
If the experts using the surveillance system examine only
the top Lq entries, then the probability of missing the target
speaker entirely is p(m) = 1 − q. Note that that ρ˜ = L0.5.
The mean target speaker position for those truncated queues
which do contain the target speaker is given by
ρ¯q =
∫ Lq
0
ρ g(ρ) dρ. (13)
ρ¯q is the average number of false alarms that must be
scanned before hitting the target speaker, considering only
the truncated queues of length Lq which contain the tar-
get speaker. Since this occurs with probability q, it follows
that with probability p(m) = 1 − q we must scan Lq false
alarms and then fail to detect the target speaker. The num-
ber of false alarms scanned per target speaker detected when
operating in prioritisation mode is then
Fs =
qρ¯q + (1 − q)Lq
q
, (14)
in comparison to the number of false alarms per target
speaker detected in verification mode, which is
Fv =
p(f)
1− p(m) =
p(f)
q
. (15)
It is apparent from the above equations that the term
qρ¯q +(1− q)Lq represents the probability that a non-target
speaker will result in a false alarm. This allows us to di-
rectly compare the performance of a system operating in
prioritization mode with the performance of the same sys-
tem operating in verification mode across a range of values
for p(m). For verification mode, p(m) is determined by
the system operating point. For prioritization mode, p(m)
is determined by the truncated queue length Lq. It is con-
venient to plot the results on a graph with the same for-
mat as the standard DET-plot, and graph false alarms per
target speaker detection against the probability of missing
the target speaker. However, it is important to remember
that the results are not directly comparable with other DET-
plots as it is relevant to the prioritization performance only,
which incorporates a number of additional mechanisms and
assumptions.
7 Modelling example
Let us now re-examine the system of 3.2 with the addi-
tional assumptions listed in section 5. First, we decide what
values of µt and σt to use. Real system implementers, of
course, are not able to simply choose these parameters, but
in this case we are interested in seeing what effect they have
on the performance of the system. Obviously we cannot
choose purely arbitrary values for both µt and σt - we must
choose such that the operating point (p(m), p(f)) lies on
the DET curve of the system. First we note that the thresh-
old t must be fixed, since we know that p(f) = 0.01 and
the false score has a standard normal distributon. Tables of
Z-values for standard normal distributions allow us to find
that t = 2.33. Since the true speaker scores are also nor-
mally distributed, we are able to select interesting values of
σt and find the corresponding µt score as
µt = t− σz, (16)
using the value of z for which p(x > z|X ∼ N(0, 1)) =
1− p(m).
We have chosen three distributions somewhat arbitrarily
in order to examine the effect on performance. The choice
of σt was made to ensure a range of different DET curves.
The resulting values of µ appear in Table 1.
Table 1. Parameters for the distributions Tn.
n σtn µtn ρ¯n ρ˜n
1 0.2 2.94 0.001964 0.0016
2 1 5.42 0.000065 0
3 5 17.78 0.000246 0
The DET curves of all three systems are shown in Fig-
ure 2. It can be seen that all systems intersect at the point
(p(f), p(m)) = (0.01, 0.001). Thus, despite their quite dif-
ferent characteristics, all three systems would exhibit the
same performance when used in verification mode at that
operating point. The mean and median target speaker ranks
are given in Table 1.
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Figure 2. DET curves for the true speaker dis-
tributions T1, T2 and T3.
Using our original example of N = 1011, and using the
figure for mean target speaker position, we find that the first
system gives 196,400,000 false alarms per target, the sec-
ond system gives 6,500,000 false alarms per target, and the
third system gives 24,600,000 false alarms per target on av-
erage. Our claim is not that these figures represent a useful
surveillance system; rather, it is that these figures represent
an improvement of approximately 5 times, 150 times and 40
times respectively over the performance of a system operat-
ing in verification mode which makes it clear that surveil-
lance systems are more usefully operated in prioritization
mode rather than verification mode.
The median values of these systems are even more in-
teresting. The values of ρ˜n listed in Table 1 show that
if the systems are to be successful half the time, an ana-
lyst need look no further than 16 entries on the queue for
system T1, and only the top entry for systems T2 and T3.
These figures were produced by Monte Carlo simulations
on a queue of 10,000 entries, repeated 100,000 times each,
so it is likely that the ‘top of the queue’ figures for systems
T2 and T3 would be degraded slightly by simulating using
a longer queue. Unfortunately, attempts to calculate mean
and median directly from the distribution through numeri-
cal integration proved difficult due to the extremely skewed
distributions.
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Figure 3. Verification and prioritization per-
formance on NIST SRE 2005 development
data, and on simulated score data with the
same 1st order statistics.
8 Experimental comparison
8.1 Data and system description
Experimental demonstration of the queuing approach
discussed in this paper was performed on the development
data for the NIST Speaker Recognition Evaluation task
from 2005. There were 2751 true speaker trials and 28492
false trials. The speaker recognition system was an acoustic
GMM-based system. This system has the DET curve as dis-
played in Figure 3. The outer curve represents the verifica-
tion performance of the system. The inner curve represents
the prioritization performance of the system.
The data was standardized so that µf = 0, σf = 1.
This caused the true speaker score distribution to be nearly
gaussian with µt = 5.82, σt = 2.92.
8.2 Surveillance performance
2438 of the 2751 true speaker samples were ranked at
the top of the queue, and ρ¯ = 0.0255 and ρ˜ = 0.00024. A
plot of the prioritization performance is given in Figure 3. It
can be seen that the curves representing prioritization bends
downward to meet the point (ρ¯, 0) as expected from the de-
finition of ρ¯. This results in the prioritization system having
dramatically better false alarm rates for the same miss rates
when compared to a verification system. A plot of results
simulated from pure gaussian data with the same first or-
der statistics as the experimental scores is shown in Figure
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3. As expected, the simulation displays the same behaviour
as the experimental data, but there is a significant perfor-
mance difference caused by the deviation from the experi-
mental data from gaussianity. This indicates that assessing
performance accurately will require either large-scale tests
or more accurate modelling of score distributions.
9 Discussion
It is important to remember that the significant perfor-
mance improvements as measured by ρ¯ and ρ˜ do not repre-
sent a free performance enhancement. They are predicated
on a method of use whereby results are passed to human ex-
perts in priority order for subsequent assessment and action.
However, the need for such experts in most surveillance sys-
tems means that the analysis applies in many cases. In ad-
dition, the methods presented only apply to a system which
can operate on stored data and is able to defer decision mak-
ing until all data is available. For example, a system may
gather data for 24 hours then present the results to the ex-
perts in the form of a queue. A system which is required to
present item-by-item decisions will not be able to operate in
prioritization mode.
It is possible, indeed likely, that experts will not be able
to correctly identify the target speaker with absolute accu-
racy. This may be taken into account in the above analysis
quite simply. If an expert misses the target speaker with
probability pe(m) = x, then the effective probability of a
truncated queue of length Lq missing the target speaker is
p(m) = x(1− q), and the rest follows.
Other researchers have written about a number of tech-
niques used to improve the performance of speaker recog-
nition systems. We note that it is possible that some tech-
niques may change the behaviour of surveillance systems
in a similar manner to the change in performance seen be-
tween T1, T2 and T3 in section 7, while not having as signif-
icant an impact on the performance of verification systems.
The effects of techniques such as those discussed below,
and new techniques trialled in the future, should be exam-
ined for their effect on queue prioritization performance as
described in this paper.
It was noted in [10] that the use of Bayes factor scor-
ing tended to cause a counter-clockwise rotation of the DET
curve, which would normally be consistent with an decrease
in the σ-ratio. However, it was noted that direct measure-
ment of the variance of the actual true-speaker and false-
speaker score distributions revealed that the σ-ratio had in-
creased. The counter-clockwise rotation of the DET curve
was interpreted as an effect of the increased Gaussianity (as
revealed by negentropy statistics) of the score distributions.
Whether Bayes factor scoring is indeed beneficial to surveil-
lance applications is unknown and should be determined by
further experiment.
It has been shown that the use of T-norm with large co-
hort sizes [2], and feature mapping with T-norm [7], also
causes a noticeable counter-clockwise rotation of the DET
curve. Until further analysis of the cause of this rotation is
available, it is unknown whether these techniques are bene-
ficial to surveillance filtering performance.
10 Conclusions
Most surveillance systems need some level of human in-
volvement in the outcomes. As such it may not be necessary
to force the automated components of the system to make
hard accept/reject decisions. By focussing instead on prior-
itization of samples, automated systems are able to achieve
significant improvements in performance, as measured by
false alarms per target detection for truncated queues. A
model for the performance of systems having Gaussian out-
put score distributions for target speakers and false speakers
was given. This model was shown to have good correspon-
dence to the performance of a real speaker recognition sys-
tem.
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